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Abstract:

Participatory governance is a feasible method in the context of a need for
effective governance. With the introduction of participatory governance, the
focus has shifted to how to empower. A comparative study of two cases in
this paper finds that full empowerment is the key to effective governance in
participatory governance. Full empowerment can motivate a community to
participate through the empower of rights and resources and can improve
community participation capacity through the introduction of technical
services. The full empowerment encourages a community to undertake
its due responsibility and thus forms a mechanism of the simultaneous
downward shift of right and responsibility; the refined technical services
enhance community participation capacity and thus develop the mechanism
of self-management and adaptation, and the interactions between multiple
agents produces a coordinating mechanism for government empowerment
and community acceptance.
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C

hina uttered its first call for the modernization of the national governance system and capacity
at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013.① The Opinions
of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Implementing the Rural Revitalization
Strategy, the “No. 1 central document for 2018,”② went further to propose “effective governance”
in rural areas.③ The “No. 1 central document for 2022” listed highlighting practical results in
improving rural governance as one of the eight key tasks for comprehensively promoting rural
revitalization.④ Through the practice, participatory governance provides a path for local governments
in their governance system innovations. So what factors affect the participatory governance of rural
communities and how to carry out it? This question is worth studying.

Literature Review and Problems
Participatory governance originated in the 1990s and was mainly used for the protection of
global natural resources. In recent years, it has been gradually introduced into the fields of political,
economic, and social development, especially at the level of local governance. On the one hand, the
development of participatory governance has a theoretical origin in participatory democracy; on the
other hand, it has its own needs, and has begun to seek new governance schemes in the “growing
fascination with governance mechanism as a solution to market and/or state failures” (Jessop, 1998).
Participatory governance has been extensively studied overseas, with a focus on “empowerment”
and “participation.” What is empowerment? Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright defined participatory
governance as a process of empowerment, which empowers individuals or organizations who have a
stake in pertinent policies and expands their participation in the decision-making of public policies.
Stakeholders need certain empowerment from the government when they participate in coordination
and negotiation with the latter, and such empowerment is the core and important premise of
participatory governance (Patsias, Latendresse & Bherer, 2013).
Who are the participants? First, the participation involves multiple agents, including individuals,
non-government organizations, enterprises, and government departments. Second, participation must
include participation in decision-making so those affected by the decision-making, especially the
marginalized and disadvantaged groups, can effectively join the governance process. This increased
participation is expected to improve the understanding of ordinary individuals in the areas of
psychological, technical, and procedural levels, and thus contribute to the participatory process (Yuan,
2011, p. 108). Third, participation is a premise for governance, and it is through such participation that
① Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Retrieved from http://news.12371.cn/2013/11/12/
ARTI1384256994216543.shtml
② The “No 1 central document” is the name traditionally given to the first policy statement of the year released by the central authorities, and is seen as an
indicator of policy priorities.
② Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Implementing the Rural Revitalization Strategy. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/
zhengce/2018-02/04/content_5263807.htm?isappinstalled=0
③ Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Comprehensively Promoting Rural Revitalization in 2022. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/
zhengce/2022-02/22/content_5675035.htm
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government and society develop a relationship of mutual trust and cooperation and thus form a new
foundation for governance (Sun, 2004, p. 26).
Chinese scholars have different focuses in their understanding of participatory governance.
Wang Xixin (2010) defines participatory governance from the perspective of administrative decisionmaking, emphasizing people’s participation in the government’s public policies. Zhang Jingen (2014)
accepts the definition of “empowered participatory governance” proposed by Fung and Wright,
focusing on the empowerment to the public. Despite these varying emphases, most scholars agree
that participation, empowerment, and multi-agent consultation and cooperation are the keys to
the understanding of participatory governance (Rao & Chen, 2014; Chen & Zhao, 2009; Fang &
Xu, 2015; Liu, 2014). We explain participatory governance from the perspective of empowerment.
Agreeing with the definition by Fung and Wright, we view participatory governance as a process
of empowering individuals and organizations who have a stake in public policies and expanding
their participation in the decision-making regarding such policies. We hold that empowerment
in participatory governance is the premise for the participation of concerned individuals and
organizations, and also the source of motivation for the participation of such individuals and
organizations. Empowerment plays a decisive role in participatory governance.
The accumulative research on participatory governance by Chinese scholars can be seen from
two aspects: The first is the introduction of the concept of participatory governance, including its
theoretical origin and the status quo of its development in foreign practice; and the second is the
study of the participatory governance in China. In particular, the practice of participatory governance
includes the following: first, the classification of participatory governance, including self-governance
for villagers, community-level self-governance, and participatory budgeting (Fang & Xu, 2015;
Chen & Zhao, 2009); second, the function of participatory governance. Scholars usually start with
the relationships between the state and society, believing that participatory governance can help in
improving the scientific and democratic decision-making and public participation (Rao & Chen, 2014;
Liu, 2014); third, the discussion about the factors behind the operation of participatory governance,
including the support and guidance of local governments, the active participation of non-governmental
organizations and scholars, and the positive civic culture (Wang, 2010; Rao & Chen, 2014; Zhao,
2015), and the local cultural background (Heinelt & Smith, 2003); and fourth, the universal problems
such as insufficient empowerment (Chen & Xu, 2013), insufficient social participation and insufficient
capacity for action that scholars have found from the perspective of practice (Chen & Xu, 2013; Hu, &
Xiang, 2014; Fang & Xu, 2015).
As scholars have found, insufficient empowerment is caused by the following factors. The
first is the insufficient legal empowerment. Taking the innovation of basic-level governments in
public decision-making represented by participatory budgeting as an example, one can find that the
restriction on public power at the grassroots level is not abundant. The second is the the pressure
system of administrative operation. Empowerment may slow down a lower authority’s step to
meet the demands from the higher level (Fu & Wang, 2011). The third is the insufficient capacity
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for community participation, which includes an inadequate capability for individual participation,
and inadequate capacity for organizational participation (Hu & Xiang, 2014). The fourth is the an
insufficient supply of external resources (Hu & Xiang, 2014), or weak motivation for community
participation caused by limited participation space (Zhang, 2016).
After further exploration, however, one can find a conflict between the concept of participatory
governance and the current governance structure. The traditional rural community governance in
China used to be mainly clan and squire governance. Since the implementation of the household
contract responsibility system, the rural areas in China have restored their family-based “selfsufficiency,” and at the same time, a large scale of population outflow has reduced the capability of
self-governance, and the villager self-governance system attaches more importance to election rather
than governance in its implementation. All these have resulted in a series of problems.
Participatory governance requires the government to take the initiative in distributing
empowerment while the community must take the initiative to participate. Fragmentation occurs
within the community resulting in dependence on the government, low willingness to participate, and
insufficient ability to participate.
As a result of such conflict between concept and reality, there is still a huge space to explore the
localized practice of participatory governance, and scholars are putting forward suggestions from
different perspectives. At the macro level, according to their reports, we should improve the status quo of
empowerment through legal empowerment and institutional design (Zhang, 2014; Fang & Xu, 2015). At
the micro level, it is advisable to encourage the participation of social organizations and experts (Chen, &
Xu, 2013; Liu, 2014) cultivate community self-organization, and develop their capability to participate (Hu
& Xiang, 2014; Fang & Xu, 2015) and respect for the local cultural background (Zhao, 2015).
Responding to the academic circles’ appeal and the government’s change in governance mode,
many local governments have gradually built the awareness of “empowerment” and performed
relevant activities, taking the initiative to try participatory governance. The crux has shifted from
whether to empower 20 years ago to the present question of how to empower. This paper argues that
full empowerment is a key factor behind participation governance and that full empowerment means
that the basic government grants comprehensive resources and rights to the public in the practice of
community-level participatory governance, and at the same time provides the refined service required
for effective governance, to effectively improve community governance. Here, the term “resources”
refers to funds or materials provided by the government, the term “rights” to the right of management
granted to community-level self-governance organizations, and the term “refined service” mainly to
the externally offered training and support of relevant skills concerning participation, organization,
and management in the practice of community self-governance. The following discussion is
mainly based on the cases of participatory governance with two county-level governments’ active
empowerment, and through a comparative study of the empowerment carried out by county-level
governments in participatory governance. We will delve into the conditions of full empowerment and
the practical mechanisms needed for effective rural governance.
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An Overview on the Cases and the Train of Thought for the Research
An Overview of the A County Community Development Fund Project
A county implemented the project of poverty alleviation in 2007, one of whose sub-projects is the
industrial alternative development project. In the original project design, villages were supposed to
submit their plans for industrial alternative development to the township or town authorities, and those
at the county level to review and distribute funds and implement the plans. After the first round of
implementation in 2007－2008, the Poverty Alleviation and Immigration Office found that after the
community purchased tree seedlings or distributed fertilizer to the farmers, some seedlings did not
grow, and the project was not ideal.
From 2008 to 2009, the Poverty Alleviation Office of A county cooperated with G Community
Development Center to run the industrial alternative development fund under the project by means of
participatory governance and established community development funds, which were finally applied
for by 27 deprived villages. The county poverty alleviation office provided 150,000 to 320,000 yuan,
and the G Community Development Center was in charge of capacity building and technical support,
with the project accomplished in two phases within four years. By the end of 2020, 25 of the 27
community funds had been operating normally, while the other two communities retained the project
principal without starting the project. The principal of the project has risen from 7.64 million yuan
to 9.7 million yuan, an increase of more than 2.06 million yuan. Accordingly, the accumulative loans
for this project accounted for nearly 44.32 million yuan, with 5,796 farming households benefitting in
total.①
We studied L village as a key analysis case. This village is about 8 kilometers away from the
county seat, enjoying good public transport. It consists of 263 households in four groups, with a
population of 973. The main incomes of the villagers come from the growing of crops, fruit trees,
and migrant work outside of the village, averaging 10,000 yuan or so for each person in 2019. L
village received the training in community development funds in 2009, and registered itself as a
cooperative legal person and opened a bank account in 2010. In 2012, the village officially entered
the operational stage of villager loans, which has been running well so far with a net increase
of about 100,000 yuan. The entire process of the community fund development in this village
is representative, for it has encountered the typical difficulties of reluctant candidates, delayed
repayments, and changes in rules, but the community fund in the village runs smoothly in general,
and the person in charge of the community fund gradually gained trust among the villagers and was
elected the director of village committee in the end, so the growth of the management in the entire
project operation is also representative.

① Data from G Community Development Center.
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Overview of Collective Forest Tenure Reform and Forest Eco-Compensation Project in B
County
B County is a big forest county. The provincial forestry department in charge of B county issued
an opinion on promoting the reform of the collective forest tenure system in 2007, instructing, “In the
case of mountains under a collective’s unified management, the mountain forests that the masses are
fairly satisfied with and unwilling to divide can remain under the collective’s unified management,
but the operational mechanism should be changed under the principle of ‘division of shares without
the division of the mountain, and distribution of profits without the distribution of forests,’ adopting
shareholding cooperation and averaging shares and profits to each household.” B county accomplished
its forest tenure reform by following the principle of “division of shares without the division of the
mountain, and distribution of profits without the distribution of forests.” It began to allocate ecological
compensation funds in 2011. For the better management of the forest eco-compensation funds, the
Forestry Bureau of W county, urged by an incumbent deputy county mayor of this county, took each
administrative village as a unit to set up management boards of collective forestry shares, with each
board in charge of the management of those ecological compensation funds and collective forests.
The compensation funds followed the Provincial Department of Finances’ 2014 provincial ecocompensation standard of collective non-commercial forests, accounting for 16.09225 million yuan
each year, with 14.75 yuan for each mu.
We selected X village in B county for this case study. This village is 20 kilometers away from
the county seat, with an area of 25.1 square kilometers and an average altitude of more than 2,800
meters. It is populated by 148 farming households and has an agricultural population of about 500.
The income of villagers mainly comes from agricultural production, livestock breeding, medicine
collection, and migrant work. This village has 11,938.9 mu of collective forest with eco-compensation,
and the annual eco-compensation fund is 173,114 yuan, with 10 percent to be set aside for public uses,
which is according to the 10 percent ratio. The Forestry Bureau and the social organization S began
to cooperate in 2013, selecting this village to experiment with participatory governance hoping to
enhance the management of the boards and organizations of other villages in B county through a
demonstration of the social organization S.
The Train of Thought for Research
We made a comparative analysis of two cases in which the two county governments took
the initiative to adopt participatory governance to explore the factors and practical mechanisms
used by a basic-level government as it carries out empowerment in participatory governance. The
two projects were highly comparable. First, their surroundings were basically the same. The two
counties are under the same geographical conditions dominated by high mountains and semi-high
mountains and have largely the same culture. The income of villagers mainly depends on migrant
work, and the local economies also have a similar structure, mainly based on crop growth and
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husbandry.
Second, the two projects also display
a certain similarity. First, they were
both the management projects of input
resources dominated by the countylevel, involving the interests of all the
communities, and implemented through
par ticipator y gover nance. Second,
they have temporal proximity. The
Community Development Fund Project
in A county officially began in 2010,
while the collective forest management
project in B county started in 2011. The
two projects were faced with largely
the same environment, and both were
still in normal operation. Third, they Figure 1. Project preparation mechanism
have the same operating mechanism. As
can be seen from Figure 1, the two projects have the basic operating mechanism that the countylevel governments actively use it to carry out empowerment, delegate management authority and
resources, and guiding and encouraging communities to establish self-organization for project
management. The governments bring in social organizations to provide technical services, to
enhance the communities’ awareness and ability to participate. Both projects have their own
relatively complex system of implementation, management, and supervision. The similarity in the
regional environment and operational mechanisms of these two projects lays a foundation for their
comparability.
Based on the comparability of the two cases, we developed the following analytical thinking.
First, as is shown in comparison, both participatory governance projects with the empowerment
that the two basic-level governments took the initiative to carry out (Table 1) have basically
achieved their project objectives, but there are differences in the degree of villager participation
and the sustainable operation of self-organization. Through further analyses of the source of
such differences, we found that these differences come from the degrees of empowerment,
i.e., the degrees of the supply of rights and resources and the degrees of refining of technical
services despite the similarities between the two projects in terms of their operational modes
and structures, and that these factors are probably the key reasons for the differences behind the
levels of participatory governance. Therefore, we will present our detailed comparative study of
these three dimensions, and finally, through a comparative analysis of these two cases, we will
summarize the basic conditions and practical mechanisms of full empowerment in community
participatory governance.
89

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES No.4. 2022

Table 1 Comparison of the A County Community Development Fund Project and the B county Collective Forest Management Board
Project
Similarities

Project effectiveness comparison

Comparison of rights and resource
allocation

Technical service comparison

Differences

Basically, achieved project objectives

Different in achievement degrees, especially in
villager participation degree

Improved the community governance
structure to a certain extent

Different in achievement degrees, especially in
the sustainable operation of self-organization

Specifically allocating resources to the
community in the form

Different in the integrity of decision-making
power over resources

Specifically authorizing the community in Different in the integrity of self-management
the form
rights
Promoted the construction and
participation of self-organization

Different in the degrees of refinement

Institutionalized guarantee of selforganized operation

Different in the timing of participation

A Comparison of Practical Effects
The two participatory governance took the initiative to conduct top-down empowerment, and
have achieved some positive results in community governance, but there are also some disparities.
The Positive Results of the Projects
From the perspective of project operation, the two projects have lasted for 10 years, and are still
running normally today. They have achieved positive results.
First, both have reached their project objectives and facilitated the coordination between resources
and demands. The community development fund project in A county aims to improve the use
efficiency of poverty alleviation funds through the operation of community funds, alleviate the
community residents’ problems of inadequate production funds and difficulties in borrowing money,
and at the same time strengthen the independent management abilities of villages in poverty. From
the perspective of project operations, the development fund operations of twenty-five communities in
A county have served farming households more than 4,700 times in the past 10 years, responding to
the actual needs of villagers. Villagers in L village express that these small loans from the community
development fund are useful in solving pressing needs such as the schooling of children and the
illness of family members, and their life problems in purchasing agricultural materials and making
a livelihood. The twenty-five community development funds have been in operation for ten years,
which is evidence that these communities are capable of independent management.
The operational goal of the Collective Forest Management Board in B county is to support
community collective protection actions and improve the effectiveness of collective forest
conservation. Figure 2 presents the ratings of the eighty-eight boards in B county concerning
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Figure 2. Chart of changes in the number of good ratings obtained by the
community collective forest protection boards in B county (2012-2019)

Marks in the Assessment

Good Ratings
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Year

Figure 3. Chart of changes in the assessment of collective forest
Management in X Village (2012-2019)

collective forest protection which reveal an upward trend in the number of communities with good
ratings, in a protective direction.
X village has improved its protection effects with the help of social organizations by means
of a collective forest management plan and action adjustments. As shown in Figure 3, this
village has gradually improved its performance in collective forest management and protection
from unqualified to qualified since 2014.
Second, the community gover nance str ucture has been improved. First, a new
organizational relationship was formed. Referring to Figure 1, both projects have embedded
new self-organizations into their original community governance structures. With all the rural
villagers’ committees retaining their core positions, the two village committees (CPC village
branch committee and rural villagers’ committees) of each village and self-organizations
have empowering-empowered and supervising-supervised relationships. This increased
the likelihood of refined project execution. By clarifying the boundaries of both the rural
villagers’ committee and a self-organization’s rights and resources, they have become a benign
management increase without weakening the original governance structure. In this way, they
play a positive role in the management of public affairs, improve the governance efficiency
of single public affairs, and bring more satisfaction to the villagers. The new management
structure not only ensures the authority of the rural villagers’ committees but also improves the
villagers self governance.
Difference in the Degrees of Villagers’ Participation
In the two projects, villagers’ participation is both an important means and an important
goal of project implementation. Since the implementation of these projects, the participation of
villagers has improved, but there is a disparity between the degrees of villagers’ participation in
the projects.
The participation in decision-making in L village. As discovered in the field interviews in
L village, the villagers attend community meetings and take part in the making of the rules
for community development funds, play a part in the operation of the community development
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funds by means of loans or guarantees, and are basically informed of the core operational rules
of the community development funds such as the timeline of loans, the exquisite guarantors,
and the overdue payment when an expiring loan is not paid back.
According to the director of the poverty alleviation office, relevant publicity has informed
the villagers that “the mutual aid funds are for everyone, each villager has been entitled, and
every household has its quota.”① Now that the villagers in L village have participated widely
in the establishment and operation of their community development funds, the field random
interviews in L village show that the villagers from this village have been relatively well
informed of the core operational rules of the community development funds, including the
timeline of loans, the exquisite guarantors, and the overdue payment when an expiring loan is
not paid back.
The villagers are clear that there are individual quotas in the community funds; they are
active in taking part in the establishment of rules, the issuance of and supervision over fund
loans, and participate in the project operation in various degrees. That improves the villagers’
recognition of the operation of the community funds and can be classified as decision-making
participation, which is important for the sustainable operation of the project.
Expressive participation in X village. The publicity, initiation, and establishment of the
collective forest management board project in B county were given high priority. The Forestry
Bureau planned in the middle of June 2011 to start the work of the board and in the middle
of July required the communities in each village to set up their board of directors and submit
a draft of its regulations. Because of such haste, each village formulates its own village
management regulations by referring to the charter and time arrangement of the collective forest
in B county, and the villagers who participate in the village-level collective forest management
board of directors of the local election, management system design, and management work is
not much. The participation in the boards in charge of collective forests in B county is more of
an expressive participation with expressive empowerment (Fang & Xu , 2015).
Differences in the Sustainable Operation of Self-Organizations
The operation of self-organizations in each of the two projects has a decisive impact on the
sustainability of that project, while the factors behind the sustainability of self-organizations
themselves come from both the external and the internal. In particular, the external factors are the
attitudes of higher authorities and the support system, and the internal ones include the ability of
self-organizations to perform independent management and its independent use of resources.
The sustainable operation of community development funds in A county. From the
perspective of the internal environment, the management of community development funds
in A county and the use of their resources are in a good state, and the self-organizations there
① Quoted from an interview with the former director of the A County Poverty Alleviation Office in December 2019.
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operate independently under the supervision of the rural villagers’ committees and have strong
independent management. Take L village as an example. The council and supervisory board
were elected through a community assembly, and the basic rules of community fund operation
were formulated on their own. The council chairperson E believes that the smooth operation of
the community development fund was related to the development of the villagers’ assembly, for
the villagers themselves attended the assembly to elect management personnel and make the
rules. The secured loan system was also designed by the fund council in accordance with the
average quota of community funds among alL villagers. In particular, one household without
guarantee can borrow 2,000 yuan, one household with a three-household guarantee can borrow
5,000 yuan, and one household with a six-household guarantee can borrow 10,000 yuan. This
operational system has been accepted by the villagers and has ensured the sound operation of
the community development fund.
L village moderately amended its rules along with the operation of its community
development fund. This village has good transport thanks to its location close to the county
seat and at first adopted the policy of immediate loans for any application with respect to its
community development funds. After a few years of operation, however, it was found that
this had caused too heavy a workload to accountants and cashiers. After a consultation by
the villagers’ assembly, the lending rule was changed to twice a year, with loans concentrated
to free accountants and cashiers from the heavy workload. L village has a strong sense of
independent management in its operation of community development funds, including the
formulation and appropriate adjustment of rules, while taking into account the fairness,
transparency and adaptability of the system and its implementation.
With respect to the use of resources, in reference to the implementation rules of the
community development funds of A county, “the community development fund is the common
asset of all villagers, over which the villagers’ assembly has the final decision-making power.”
Self-organizations are entitled to use funds independently, and the villagers continue to benefit
from the community development funds. As a result, this form of microcredit is accepted
among the villagers, and its operation has remained within the range of safety.
Second, in terms of the surroundings, several government departments in A county
have been aiding the operation of the community development fund. The A county Poverty
Alleviation Office is the competent agency of the fund, the Civil Affairs Bureau takes charge of
the regular audit and inspection of the fund, the County Agricultural Economic Service Center
checks regularly and irregularly the account records and financial public notices, and the Rural
Credit Cooperative assists the circulation of the funds. The continuous support from external
systems has ensured the safety of the operating environment. From internal and external
conditions, the operation of community development funds is sustainable.
Comparatively speaking, the B county Collective Forest Management Boards are faced
with relatively complex internal and external environments. First, in terms of their internal
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environment, the practice of having the same personnel in two organizations, namely the boards
and the two village committees, has become increasingly common within the territory of the
county. Consequently, the boards of directors were gradually merged into the organizational
system of the two village committees and lost their independence. Moreover, they are poor in
independent management. For collective forest management, for example, a board of directors
should hold a general assembly of shareholders to elect village patrol guards to carry out
protection work in accordance with established procedures. However, the first batch of patrol
guards in X village was not elected by the general assembly of shareholders. Some of the patrol
guards were villagers working outside the village for a long time and failed to perform their
management and protection duties, which caused a loss of points in the assessment at the end of
the year. This was one of the reasons that X village failed to pass the 2012-2013 assessment of
collective forest protection. One of the important objectives of the collective forest management
board is to facilitate the village as a community to fulfill the responsibility of collective
forest protection, but the board did not develop the acuity of independent management. With
respect to the use of resources, the public funds set aside from the forest eco-compensation
have a strictly confined scope and can only be used for collective forest protection. In 2015,
the entire county accumulated its set-aside amounts of collective forest funds up to more than
10 million yuan. Moreover, the financial system of “village finance managed by the township
government” created a complicated procedure for the use of resources, and many villages didn’t
know how to use those set-aside funds.
In terms of the external environment, the government of County B supports the county
Forestry Bureau to set aside part (10 percent-20 percent) of the compensation fund as the public
fund of the village collective, which is managed by the collective forest management board
of the community in each village. However, higher forestry authorities want to distribute all
the compensation funds to households, fearing that the funds will not be safe, so the B county
forestry bureau is very cautious about using public funds.
Both projects have achieved their goals on the condition that the basic-level governments
take the initiative to carry out empowerment, but there are gaps in terms of the participation
by villagers and the sustainable operation of self-organizations. As mentioned above, under the
circumstance that the two projects are similar in both the external environment and structural
design, rights and resources as the main supply factors of the empowerment by basic-level
governments and technical services as the supply factor of social organizations are worth
further discussion.

Comparison Between the Supply of Rights, Resources, and Technical
Services
The two county-level governments as suppliers of rights and resources set up platforms
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│当代社会科学│2 0 2 2年第4 期│

for community participation through explicit empowerment. They strengthen the motivation
for community participation by injecting capital and physical resources into communities,
and enhanced community participation by introducing technical empowerment. Community
governance has been improved through the empowerment of the local government’s initiatives,
but the degrees of rights, resource empowerment, and technical services affect the effectiveness
of community governance.
Supply of Rights, Resources, and Techniques
In terms of empowerment, both projects have empowerment from the county-level
governments, and the rights and resources are clearly assigned to villages. Meanwhile, technical
services from social organizations are introduced for technical empowerment.
Clear empowerment to villages: build a platform for community participation.
Both counties have taken the initiative to delegate power to communities. In the A county
community development fund projects, the councils and supervisory boards are elected
through villagers’ assemblies. The councils consult with the villagers to devise methods for the
management and supervision of funds, and at the same time accept the external supervision of
the villagers’ assemblies, rural villagers’ committees, township or town governments, poverty
alleviation offices, and social organizations. These community development fund councils as
new self-organizations are real exercisers of the rights in question.
The B county Forestry Bureau also delegates rights and responsibilities to the village-level
councils through various documents. Through supporting documents, the bureau makes it clear
that the boards have the right to operate and manage the shares of both forestland and forests,
and empowers leaders of innovation by seeing that they have more human, financial, and
material resources, as well as the set-aside funds for public uses, at their disposal, and at the
same time undertake the corresponding management and protection obligations. According to
the agreement, the boards of directors are community self-organizations with certain resources
and authority and are empowered with independent operation.
Clear resources to villages: enhancing the motivation for community participation.
Both county governments have made it clear that the resources will be allocated to villages.
The A county government decided to distribute funds to villages after some discussion and
agreement among various departments but stipulated that the development funds within
a community would be for mutual assistance. As a result, the resources after allocations,
were moved to the communities under clear private ownership in the archive, with the clear
requirement that they are managed by a community fund council to avoid the equal sharing
of funds within the community. That frees relevant departments from the concerns about
ownership and fund security and empowers communities in terms of resources by making it
clear that the community has the ownership and usage rights of the funds.
The Forestry Bureau of B county also designed a similar management system for the
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collective forest management board stipulating that a community set aside 10 percent－
20 percent of collective forest compensation funds to support the public management and
protection of collective forests, and that such set-aside funds for public uses can be used for
payments to the patrol guards or as the public expenditures for the maintenance of related
supporting facilities. Moreover, it has formulated supporting systems concerning supervision,
reward, and punishment, and makes it clear that the board of directors is responsible for the
management and protection of collective forests.
Introducing technical empowerment with social organizations: enhancing the ability of
community participation.
Both county governments are active in bringing in social organizations to provide
technical services. A county introduced the G Community Development Center which helps
build the implementation frameworks for community development funds and formulate
detailed rules for the implementation of community development funds to support the entire
project. B county introduced social organization S to carry out a pilot test in X village, to
demonstrate the management of village-level collective forests, improve board management
systems, and enhance the efficiency of collective forest management and protection. Both
social organizations have provided technical services such as the spread of information, the
improvement of community governance structures, assistance in institutionalization, and
supervision over the operation of self-organizations.
Differences in Government Empowerment
The two county-level governments show differences in the integrity of their empowerment
and the degrees of refinement of technical services although both carry out the empowerment
of rights, resources, and technical empowerment.
Differences in the integrity of independent management rights.
Differences in the status of legal persons of self-organizations.
The community development funds in A county have been registered as a specialized
cooperative. This identity provides strong support for the later work of the community
development funds, including the registration of business accounts and the independent
management within a community. According to A county’s community development fund
implementation rules, the County Civil Affairs Bureau is responsible for the registration of
community development funds, including the perfection of registration information and the
examination of registration qualifications. According to the poverty alleviation office at that
time, the former director had even traveled to the city to purchase special paper for registration
because the county Civil Affairs Bureau was in lack of it. The registration of the community
development funds as legal persons was supported by the departments of the A county
government and individuals, which ensures access to their independent identities.
The collective forest management boards in B county are not registered as legal persons and
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therefore lack legal independence. Various government departments worked together to provide
technical support for the communities to set up the boards in question. The Civil Affairs Bureau
of B county did not help the boards of directors to register themselves, although it did support
their establishment and operation. Consequently, the communities cannot apply for a business
account and must borrow through the financial accounts of the two village committees. As a
result, the boards of directors lack the identity of legal persons which is an important support
in the management of collective forests although they are nominally independent organizations,
and the resources are accordingly managed by the two village committees. Therefore, the
boards of directors are self-organizations that have not been fully empowered.
Differences in the independence of self-organizations’ management. These differences
are mainly seen in the independence of self-organizations and the effectiveness of the system.
In A county, the G Community Development Center holds that the community development
fund must have its independent management organization, which shall be managed by trusted
members elected by residents of the community. At the same time, considering the authority of
the two village committees, the staff of the G Community Development Center explained the
relationship between the community development funds and the two village committees, saying
that the two village committees are both empowers and supervisors, while the community
development funds are the empowerees and supervisees. The clarifying of the relationship of
these two guarantees certain independence of the self-organizations and the embedding of the
original management system.
In terms of supporting systems, the community development fund systems in A county are
independently formulated by villagers. Take L village as an example. The formulation of their
system has gone through a long process. In the first step, L village arranged the members of
the rural villagers’ committee to receive the training for the project of community development
funding, so that they could clearly understand the background and future operation of such
projects. In the second step, the members of the rural villagers’ committee of L village and
the staff of the G Community Development Center did project promotion and mobilized the
residents within the community, so that every household could be well informed of the project.
In the third step, the members of the rural villagers’ committee collected votes among four
groups after the dissemination of relevant information to elect the community fund management
team. In the fourth step, the management team convened the rural villagers’ committee to
discuss and determine the management methods of the community development fund. Usually,
these systems are preliminarily designed by the management team members and then improved
by the community assembly. The two village committees, members of self-organizations, and
villagers within the community all had a clear understanding of the community development
fund and participated in the planning of the system. Due to openness and transparency in the
designing process, the system is highly acceptable among the villagers, and its operation has
also been recognized by different interest groups in the community. This has thus maintained
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the effectiveness of the system.
The boards of directors of collective forests in B county were designed to have a similar
orientation as that in A county. They are independent organizations under the leadership of
the two village committees and manage and protect collective forests. However, as mentioned
above, because the boards of directors in B county lacked legal independence, the membership
of the committees highly overlapped, and the self-organizations gradually integrated into the
rural villagers’ committee and thus lost their independence. As for the devising of the system,
at the same time, the members of the boards did not carry out extensive publicity because they
had to make a haste in submitting the regulations of the village collective forest management
board within a short month as prescribed. As a result, the villagers’ understanding of this
system is not high, and its implementation effectiveness is lacking, and the implementation is
thus inefficient.
Differences in the integrity of decision-making power over resources.
Differences in the mode of resource management. The community fund resources in A
county are managed by self-organizations. The procedure starts with the registration of such
community funds as specialized cooperative organizations in the Civil Affairs Bureau. Then,
business accounts are opened in the rural credit cooperatives, and the resources are officially
allocated to each community after the Finance Bureau allocates funds to these accounts.
In reference to the A county Community Development Fund Implementation Rules, “The
community development funds are the common assets of all the villagers, and the villagers’
assembly has the final decision-making power over the funds in question.” The councils are
elected executive bodies responsible for the management of community development funds.
The two village committees, county- and township-level government departments, and external
social organizations are all assisting and supervising institutions, and do not interfere in the
resource management within communities.
In B county, forest eco-compensation funds, like other funds in the village, are “village
finance managed by the township governance.” Because the boards of directors are not
registered in the Civil Affairs Bureau, and thus cannot open an independent business account of
set-aside public funds, the payment accounts of such funds are all opened under the accounts of
the rural villagers’ committees. Collective funds are allocated to the accounts of the two village
committees by the County Finance Bureau, and individual funds to the accounts of farming
households by the same bureau.
Differences in the decisions about the use of resources. In A county, the use of community
funds after their allocation to a community is confined to “production, or contingent or
temporary expenditures, rather than non-productive consumption.” The borrowing and lending
of funds within this scope are managed by the community fund councils and receive external
supervision. No other higher-level departments interfere with such community funds.
The set-aside amounts of forest eco-compensation funds in B county are also confined
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in terms of their use. According to the measures in the province, compensation funds should
fully be distributed to households, so the setting-aside of public funds in B county is something
innovative, but the use of such set-aside funds is strictly confined and has to be pertinent
with the management and protection of collective forests. For example, X village sets aside 10
percent of its collective forest funds, which can only be used as subsidies for the patrol guards
instead of other public affairs in the village. Moreover, if it must be done through the accounts
of the rural villagers’ committee, and any remaining funds will be stockpiled because the
boards of directors do not know how to use them.
Differences in the technical services of social organizations.
The differences in technical supplies in these two projects are also an influential variable in
their operation.
Different degrees of refinement.
The G Community Development Center arranges its work within the community in as
detailed a way as possible, providing accompanying services. Take the informative promotion
as an example. The G Community Development Center first offered the training of village
cadres, training them to disseminate information and do mobilization in the community.
Then, it carried out return visits within the community, to ascertain to what degree the
villagers had really been informed of the community development fund. It did so to help the
villagers understand the source, intentions, and basic principles of project funding. The refined
dissemination of information alleviates the problem of information asymmetry in community
governance.
After the commencement of a community development fund, the community is
accompanied as it goes through at least one cycle of operation, to provide support for the
solutions of unexpected problems in the operational process. For example, after a village started
the trial operation of its first round of loans, a mother and her daughter came to get loans by
guaranteeing for each other. Other villagers protested that they were relatives who were not
qualified for mutual guarantee, but the mother and daughter argued that the management
measures proposed that father and son could not mutually guarantee the loans but did not
explicitly say that mother and daughter could not do it either. Because of this unexpected
occurrence, the village had to stop all loan activities, withdraw the money already lent, and
state more detailed management rules, articulating that mother and daughter cannot mutually
guarantee a loan. The community fund re-started after that.
In B county, social organization S did not conduct any large-scale publicity within the
community, nor did it confirm the degree of the villagers’ knowledge about the collective forest
management board. The regulations were improved mainly through the discussion among
the villagers representatives, with the first draft discussed and approved by the community
assembly. However, due to the scattered distribution of X village, many villagers were
living away from hometowns as migrant workers, and fewer attend the villagers’ assembly.
99

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES No.4. 2022

Accordingly, neither the access to information nor the expression of attitudes of those who were
absent had been considered in the revision of the regulations. Moreover, in the projects run by
the boards of directors in B county, the social organization S participated in them in only a
limited way. It had in-depth participation in one single community, offering limited technical
support in other communities. Furthermore, it made no breakthrough in the cooperation with
the communities or the government, or in the system design, or in the skills of community
implementation.
Different timing of intervention services.
As the A county government took the initiative to invite the G Community Development
Center to participate in the implementation of the community development fund projects, the
G Community Development Center took part in the top design of those projects. The Center
reached an important consensus with respect to crucial questions including the ownership
and management of project resources and joined the formulation of the A county Community
Development Fund Implementation Rules. These rules specifically delineate the use of the
funds, affirming that the communities enjoy the rights to the ownership and management of
the resources, and that government departments shall be oriented toward service support, thus
laying the foundation for the development of community work in the later period.
In the case of the collective forest management projects in B county, social organization
S’s technical services were embodied in assisting communities to improve their internal
management and technical support for collective forest management, such as the planning
of the collective forest management and the development of the collective economy. Social
organization S also offered support to the business training of the boards throughout the county.
The impact of empowerment differences.
The differences in the full supply of resources and rights and in the refinement of technical
services brought multi-dimensional influences to the operation of the projects.
The Degree of completeness of empowerment affects the initiative of community
participation.
A county completely empowers the ownership of the funds, as well as the responsibility of
management. The training of the members of the management teams for the community funds
in 2009 emphasized that the government has the right to take its empowerment back where a
certain community fund is badly managed. The managers were under pressure, and there was
a widespread “fear that the loan would fail to be repaid.” Due to the empowerment of resources
and rights, the managing members changed their positions, and gained a mode of thinking
as leading roles, considering how to use the funds well and ensure their safety. Accordingly,
some guaranteeing systems were designed. The guaranteeing system further delegated the
responsibility of managers to the villagers, who had to find other farming households as
guarantors before being approved for loans. The households as guarantors would be obliged to
pay back the money if the debtors failed to repay the loans. That is based on the fact that rural
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communities are traditionally a “relationship-oriented society,” embedding the borrowing and
lending into the community networks to guard against the risk of “bad debts.”
The complete empowerment of resource ownership also ensured that villagers can benefit
from it. Many farming households in L village chose to wait and see at first. In this village, a
villager who borrows money from the community development fund must pay a membership
fee of 20 yuan to become a member, but many villagers did not pay the membership fee. Seeing
that other villagers benefited from the fund, and that the management of it was transparent
and standard, they gradually changed their wait-and-see or suspicious attitudes, applying for
membership and joining the fund operation.
In B county, a board of directors does not have the status of a legal person, and the funds are
also held in trust under the accounts of the two village committees, so it does not have the full
right to use the funds, and that lead to the failure of completely delegating the responsibility.
In accordance with regulations, the set-aside public funds cannot be used for expenses other
than patrol guards’ subsidies and services related to collective forest protection. For example,
it cannot be used for subsidies for managerial personnel. For the part of the Forestry Bureau
and the two village committees, they tacitly accepted that salaried people in the government
system should assume the management of the boards of directors now that they cannot provide
corresponding subsidies to the managers.
The villagers did not think there was a high correlation between the set-aside amounts of
eco-forest compensation funds and their own interests. But in fact, the setting aside of public
funds reduces the compensation for individual households. Often, villagers take a hesitant
attitude towards the boards that have neither an independent identity nor the qualification to
enjoy their setting aside of public funds.
The degree of refinement of technical services affects the community capabilities for
participation and management.
First, the degree of the refinement of technical services affects the community selforganizations’ capabilities for management. Take the guaranteeing system as an example, which
is a basic plan that the G Community Development Center worked out after its consultation
with the leaders of all related departments at the consultive meeting of A county. “At the
county-level consultive meeting, some people wondered what to do if a debtor refused to repay
the loan. One of those who attended the meeting came up with an idea. That was, the loan must
be guaranteed by five, or a certain number of, households before being approved. If the debtor
fails to repay the loan, those households will be involved.”①
In the training of the villager cadres and village management teams, the G Community
Development Center instructed them to think about how to attract borrowers and at the same

① Quoted from the interview with the former director of the A county Poverty Alleviation Office in September 2019.
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time convince the villagers of the managerial personnel’s proposals. The managerial personnel
further considered system designs from the perspective of fairness and justice, which was a
technique-inspiring process. In the process of technical training, the community gradually
formed the capability for self-management, and through the accumulation of habits, the
community has been encouraged to form a self-management mechanism, maintaining the
operation of community development funds.
Second, the level of technical services affects individual villagers’ capability for
participation. The G Community Development Center has enhanced the villagers’ participation
through refined technical services. Take L village as an example. At the beginning of its
community development fund project, L village helped the villagers learn about the project by
means of several rounds of promotion. Then, the villagers elected the team for community fund
management, which convenes the villagers’ assembly to discuss and negotiate the management
methods of the community development fund, and in the end, the community assembly voted
on the methods for the management of the community development fund. Several rounds of
participation encouragement have made sure that the villagers can express their intentions at
the community assembly under the condition of being well informed. The villagers’ rights
to know and participate are ensured. At the same time, the community assembly adopted the
methods the villagers used to vote, for example, to vote with beans to avoid the conflict in the
village caused by a show of hands. That improves the villagers’ ability to deal with negotiation
scenarios.
In contrast, the collective economy within the community of X village, B county,
declined soon after the withdrawal of social organization S. Thus, the situation of overlapping
memberships of the board of directors and the two village committees remains unimproved,
and the board of directors did not develop the capability for self-management.
The interaction of multiple actors affects the coordination of empowerment.
The implementation of both projects involved the participation of multiple stakeholders,
including multiple county government departments, social organizations, two village
committees within the communities, self-organizations, and villagers. In the operation of
A county community development funds, the A county government set up a leading team
involving multiple departments, and reached an empowerment framework within which a
consensus was reached through internal consultation. The stakeholders within the community,
including the two village committees, self-organizations, and villagers formed an internally
recognized operational framework for the community development fund through consultation.
The G Community Development Center, as a third party, facilitates the communications
between basic-level governments and communities, participates in the framework design of
the empowerment of basic-level governments, and provides external environment guarantees
for the operation of community development funds. It helps the community to form a highly
recognized operation system promoting the coordinated empowerment between the county102
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level government and the communities.
The leading team of B county first reached an agreement on the basic framework of
empowerment but failed to achieve a consensus about supporting measures. The multiple actors
within the community have arrived at an agreement on the framework of empowerment, but the
management of self-organizations is not elaborately designed. Social organization S failed to
manage the coordinated empowerment between the county government and the communities.
This is largely related to that social organization S has missed the top-level design and the low
degree of refinement of community technical services.
Summary
Our analysis has provided numerous examples of county-level governments’ adopting
participatory governance. From this analysis, it is clear that active empowerment can
improve community governance, and the empowered contents involve rights, resources,
and technical services. As was shown by the comparative analysis of the various cases, the
degree of empowerment is a key factor in determining whether a basic-level government can
improve community governance through participatory governance. As shown in Table 4,
full empowerment means that the government undertaking the participatory governance of
community public affairs endows the public with complete rights and resources from top to
bottom, and at the same time provides refined services required for effective governance to
facilitate the effective improvement of community governance. The term “rights” here refers
to the self-governance right of community self-organization, whose core characteristic is the
identity of the organization and the independence of management. The term “resources” refers
to the funds or materials provided by the government from top to bottom, whose core is the
decision-making power concerning resource allocation. The term “refined services” refers to
the corresponding training and support concerning the participation, organization, management,
and other skills provided externally in the practice of community self-governance, whose core
is to assist the internal enhancement of the community. All of these are necessary to enhance
communities’ motivation and the ability to participate by means of full empowerment and to
ultimately achieve effective community governance.
Table 4 Types of Empowerment
Full Empowerment (A county)

Partial Empowerment (B county)

Rights Supply

Full

Partial

Resources Supply

Full

Partial

Technical Supply

Full

Partial

Insufficient community participation exists in rural community governance, and one
of the important reasons is inadequate motivation. The full empowerment of resources and
rights helps a community gain a sense of belongingness in terms of resources, enhances the
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motivation for community participation, and stimulates community participation. The full
empowerment can break the conventional resource management structures and put into practice
new rules widely accepted by villagers. In the case of partial empowerment, however, things
may fall into the Tacitus trap, and villagers can thus choose the tactic of idle observation.
Another reason for insufficient participation is an inadequate capacity for participation. Refined
technical services can facilitate a community to improve its capabilities for participation in the
process of participation, develop its capabilities for independent management, and encourage
the independent operation of self-organizations to improve community governance.

Conclusion and Discussion: Full Empowerment and Its Practical Mechanisms
Based on this case study, we propose the concept of full empowerment, and put forward
the fact that full empowerment has an important, positive impact on the practice of effective
community governance. The mechanism of its influence is summarized as follows.
First, full empowerment is helpful for a community’s ability to undertake its responsibility,
and these two aspects constitute the entire mechanism for the concurrent delegation of rights
and responsibilities. As mentioned above, both projects promoted the delegation of resources
and management, and the coordination of community rights and responsibilities. The difference
is that the complete delegation of rights is more conducive to the villagers’ accepting the
delegated responsibilities. That was conducive to improving management awareness within the
community. The villagers become aware that when the resources are useful and available, they
are willing to undertake the responsibilities, and design a corresponding management system to
ensure the effective management of resources.
Second, refined technical services are conducive to the formation of self-management
and adaptation mechanisms in a community. Refined services are helpful for creating a good
internal and external environment for the community, assisting the community to re-organize
itself to form a new community management structure and management path, improving the
capabilities of both organizations and individuals for participation and management, developing
a mechanism for self-management and adjustments, and maintaining the sustainable operation
of community self-organizations.
Third, multi-actor interactions are conducive to the coordinating mechanisms of
empowerment. Cooperation based on multi-level consultations among government departments,
social organizations, and communities are conducive to building a framework for empowerment
and assisting the basic-level government to provide full empowerment within a safe scope. The
community can thus form a stable and safe management system to ensure an effective and safe
transition to self-management through local empowerment. The participation of multiple actors
and technical support and coordination is helpful for the coordination and balance between the
supply of government resources and the needs of communities.
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Full empowerment is the condition for the realization of participatory governance, and
its practical mechanisms include the simultaneous delegation of power and responsibility
through the operation of empowerment, both the mechanism for community self-management
and adjustments and the mechanisms for the coordination of empowerment achieve the goal
of enhancing a community’s motivation and capability for participation. The conditions and
mechanisms are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 Conditions and Mechanisms of Participatory Governance Operation
Conditions
Objectives
Basic Mechanism

Full Empowerment
Resources
Rights
Improvement of a Community’s Participatory
Motivation
Simultaneous Downshift of Power and Responsibilities

Techniques
Improvement of a Community’s Participatory
Capability
Self-management and adaptation

Empowerment and docking

Participatory governance promotes interactions between the state and society through
the process of participation. As this research shows, in community governance led by the
state, a basic-level government that is willing to take the initiative to carry out empowerment
can dominate the process of empowerment, control the risk of empowerment, improve the
efficiency of the use of resources, and improve the effectiveness of community governance,
thus creating a win-win situation.
Full empowerment as proposed in this paper has a certain explanatory significance for the
effective practice of participatory governance, but the practice of participatory governance also
involves other factors, such as local cultural backgrounds, governance traditions, and local
elites. Many factors can join together to form an influential network and may affect the process
and mechanisms of empowerment. We suggest that future studies of the effective practices of
participatory governance can include other variables, including social capital, and actors such
as township governments. Such considerations could build a more complete framework for
interpretation by including more measurements of villagers’ attitudes that could better explain
the influence of full empowerment on the practice of community governance from multiple
dimensions. The cases in this paper are based on the comparisons of two communities. The
practice of empowerment in other areas may have different logic and practice fields, so this
paper is only a preliminary discussion.
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